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Limbaugh: Limbaugh:Sacrificial Attorney:

The Sacrificial Attorney: Assignment of

Legal Malpractice Claims
White v. Auto Club Inter-InsuranceExchange'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri ruled,
in a case of first impression, that causes of action for legal malpractice are nonassignable. The court found that permitting assignments would be contrary to
public policy because assignments would create a marketplace for legal
malpractice claims, jeopardize the attorney's duties of loyalty and confidentiality
to the client, and restrict access to competent legal services. This Note agrees
with the court's result but will explore and challenge the public policy arguments
against assignment of legal malpractice claims.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On October 18, 1988, Lloyd White and Larry Stephenson ("Stephenson")
were involved in a car accident after which Lloyd and Becky White ("White")
filed a personal injury suit against Stephenson. 2 Stephenson was insured by
Auto Club Inter-Insurance Exchange ("Auto Club"), which arranged for Robert
Gould ("Gould") of Gould and Moore3 to be Stephenson's counsel.4 On
February 28, 1990, the trial court awarded White a $126,250 judgment against
Stephenson.5
Following the award, White offered Auto Club a two-part settlement.6

First, Auto Club was to pay White an amount equal to the limit of Stephenson's
liability insurance, which White correctly understood to be $50,000, plus court
costs and statutory interest! Second, White was to be assigned all of

1. 984 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
2. Id. at 157.
3. The firm's name is currently Gould and Thompson, P.C. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The settlement provides: "Auto Club Inter-Insurance Exchange will pay to
Mr. and Mrs. White the full extent of its applicable liability insurance coverage for Mr.
Stephenson, whatever that amount may be (which [plaintiff's counsel] understand[s] to
be $50,000 plus liability for court costs and statutory interest on the judgment)." Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Stephenson's claims against Auto Club and Gould.' Auto Club accepted only
the first part of White's offer.9
White and Stephenson then agreed" and later executed an assignment" of
all of Stephenson's claims against Auto Club and Gould in return for White's
forebearance in enforcing the balance of the judgment against Stephenson and
Stephenson's agreement that White would receive the policy limits of
Stephenson's liability insurance.' 2 Auto Club paid White $50,000 on March 19,
1990.13

Almost five years after the judgement, White filed suit against Auto Club,
Gould, and Gould and Thompson, alleging professional negligence on the part
of Gould 14 and conspiracy between Gould and Auto Club "to deprive
Stephenson of the opportunity and rights to force Auto Club to pay the entire
judgment entered
against [Stephenson] because of Auto Club's bad faith and
15
negligence."'
The trial court granted Auto Club's and Gould's motions for summary
judgment on White's legal malpractice and conspiracy claims, finding that the
legal malpractice claim was non-assignable. 6 White appealed to the Missouri

8. Id. The settlement provides:
Mr. and Mrs. White will receive an assignment from Mr. Stephenson of Mr.
Stephenson's claim against Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange for
breach of its fiduciary responsibilities to Mr. Stephenson, including but not
limited to Mr. Stephenson's claim against Automobile Club Inter-Insurance
Exchange for bad faith refusal and failure to settle the claims of Mr. and Mrs.
White for the offers of settlement that were made by Mr. and Mrs. White
before trial within the policy limits of insurance coverage provided to Mr.
Stephenson. Mr. Stephenson would assign to Mr. and Mrs. White all rights
and causes of action Mr. Stephenson has against Automobile Club InterInsurance Exchange and against you and your law firm, both those arising
from breach of contract with Mr. Stephenson and those arising in tort.
Id.

9. Id. The first part of the offer was accepted on March 13, 1990. Id.
10. Id. at 157-58. White and Stephenson made this agreement on March 17, 1990.
11. Id. at 158. The assignment was executed on February 12, 1995.
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. Id. White asserted that Gould was negligent and had a conflict of interest with
Auto Club and Stephenson that caused Gould to breach his fiduciary duties to
Stephenson.
15. Id. White's petition also alleged breach of contract against Stephenson for
Stephenson's failure to pay the "'policy limits' as contemplated by the March 17, 1990
agreement and Auto Club's insurance policy." Id. White's breach of contract ostensibly
was based on Auto Club's payment of only $50,000, which did not include the payment
of interest accrued on the judgment.
16. Id. at 156, 158. The trial court awarded White interest on the entire $126,250
judgment for the period up to Auto Club's $50,000 payment to White and interest on the
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which affirmed the trial

court's grant of summary judgment and held that claims for legal malpractice
cannot be assigned. 8
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Law ofAssignment in General'

At early common law, no cause of action or chose in action was
assignable.' 9 Relatively early in American jurisprudence, however, courts sitting
in equity allowed assignment of choses in action arising out of contract. 0

Progressively, equity courts began to allow the 2assignment of choses in action
arising out of torts to real or personal property. '
The test that courts in equity employed to determine whether a chose in
action was assignable was whether the cause of action survived to the
administrator or executor of the estate.22 Generally, survivability is determined
by reference to the applicable jurisdiction's survival statute or common law.23
The survivability-assignability test contains one important exception-a cause
of action that survives to the personal representative may still be held nonassignable if contrary to public policy.24

$50,000 payment for the period after the payment until the entry of summary judgment.
17. Id. at 158.
18. Id. at 160-61.
19. Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Assignability of Claims for Legal
Malpractice,40 A.L.R. 4th 684 (1995).
20. Id.
21. Id. See also Chouteau v. Boughton, 13 S.W. 877, 878 (Mo. 1890) (allowing
assignment of an action for trespass to real property, even though a tort).
22. See Dougherty, supra note 19, at 684. The test for assignability remains the
same today, except for substitution of the modem "personal representative" in lieu of
"administrator" or "executor." See Eastern Atl. Transp. & Mechanical Eng'g, Inc. v.
Dingman, 727 S.W.2d 418,423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
23. See, e.g., State ex rel. Park Nat'l Bank v. Globe Indem. Co., 61 S.W.2d 733,
735-36 (Mo. 1933) (determining assignability by reference to state statute for survival
of tort actions). Survival statutes allow a decedent's personal representative to bring or
maintain suit for certain claims. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.021 (Supp. 1998).
24. See Scweiss v. Sisters of Mercy, St. Louis, Inc., 950 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997); Marshall v. Northern Assurance Co. of Am., 854 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993); Dougherty, supra note 19, at 684 (stating that the only causes of action

which are non-assignable "are those for torts for personal injuries and for wrongs done
to the person, the reputation, or the feelings of an injured party, and those for breach of
contract of a purely personal nature, such as promises of marriage"); see also 6 AM.
JUR.2D Assignments § 39 (1963) (stating that "[iln some jurisdictions it is held that a
right of action for personal injuries is not assignable" despite a survival statute).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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B. AssignabilityofLegal MalpracticeClaims
Assignment of legal malpractice claims is a relatively recent phenomenon
(the seminal case was decided in 1976).25 Legal malpractice assignments, like
general assignments, raise three issues. First, do legal malpractice claims sound
in contract or in tort? Second, however classified, do legal malpractice claims
survive? Third, if legal malpractice claims survive, are there countervailing
public policy considerations that operate to invalidate the assignment of such
claims?
Whether a legal malpractice claim sounds in contract or in tort has been
addressed by many courts.26 Courts finding that the cause of action sounds
primarily in contract reason that the attorney-client relationship is an express or

implied contract to provide legal services.27 When the attorney violates his duty
to the client, he breaches the contract. Courts finding that the legal malpractice
cause of action sounds in tort reason that the attorney-client relationship is a
personal one, and that the attorney's violation of one of his duties to the client
is essentially negligence. 28 If a court finds that the cause of action sounds in tort,
further analysis is required. The court must ask whether the tort is one of a
purely personal nature or is a tort to real or personal property.29 While most
courts find the cause of action resembles a tort to real or personal property,30
some courts have found that the cause of action resembles a tort of a purely
personal nature. 31 Some courts find that the cause of action for legal malpractice

25. See Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 (Ct. App. 1976).
26. See Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D.N.J. 1996)
(finding tort); Oppel v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(finding both tort and contract); Scarlett v. Barnes, 121 B.R. 578, 582 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1990) (finding both tort and contract); Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (finding tort);
Christison v. Jones, 405 N.E.2d 8, 11 (Il. App. Ct. 1980) (finding tort); Tawil v.
Finkelstein Bruckman Wohl Most & Rothman, 223 A.D.2d 52, 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(finding tort); Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa.
1987) (finding tort); Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(finding tort).
27. See Dougherty, supra note 19, at 684.
28. See Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 86; Christison,405 N.E.2d at 9 (stating "[t]he

cause of action.., is, in its essence, a tort action for negligence premised upon breach
of the attorney's duties to his client").
29. See Hedlund, 539 A.2d at 358-59.

30. Id. at 359.
31. See Dougherty, supra note 19, at 684 (stating that the legal malpractice claim
is non-assignable "because of the personal relationship which exists between an attorney
and his client. .. [which] likened the action for legal malpractice to actions for torts
involving personal injuries or wrongs done to the person").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/14
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sounds in both contract and tort.32 When a court finds the claim sounds in both
contract and tort, the court looks to public policy to resolve the issue.33
Whether a legal malpractice claim survives to a client's personal
representative is the next step in determining assignability.34 As previously
stated, if it survives it is assignable. The survivability of a cause of action
requires reference to the jurisdiction's survival statutes and common law.
Causes of action arising out of contract generally survive and are assignable. 35
Causes of action arising out of tort to real or personal property generally survive
and are assignable.36 Causes of action arising out of purely personal torts, at
37
This
common law, generally did not survive and were not assignable.
generalization regarding the survival of causes of action arising out of torts of a
purely personal nature is now inappropriate.38 Some states have statutes
specifically allowing survival to the personal representative. 39 Nevertheless,
4
despite survivability, legal malpractice claims are generally non-assignable. "
The basis for finding a survivable cause of action non-assignable is public
policy.4'
Whether an assignment of a legal malpractice claim violates public policy
is the decisive issue in whether courts invalidate or permit assignments. As such,
this Note will first address the public policy arguments made by the jurisdictions
that prohibit assignments and then will address the arguments made by the
jurisdictions that permit assignment of legal malpractice claims.
Because a majority of courts addressing the issue have held such claims
non-assignable, this Note has organized the non-assignability public policy
arguments and presented them in a uniform format. The public policy arguments
against assignment are that assignments would: (1) undermine the attorney-

client relationship, (2) demean the legal profession, and (3) create a risk of
collusion.

32. See Oppel, 517 F. Supp. at 1307; Picadilly, Inc., v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338,
341 (Ind. 1991).
33. See Picadilly, 582 N.E.2d at 341.
34. See Dougherty, supra note 19, at 648.
35. See Dougherty, supra note 19, at 648.
36. See Dougherty, supra note 19, at 648.
37. See Dougherty, supra note 19, at 648.
38. See 1 Am. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, Revival § 52, § 53 (1963).
39. Id.
40. See Dougherty, supra note 19, at 684.
41. See generally Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J. 1996);
Scarlett v. Barnes, 121 B.R. 578 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990); Coffey v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 756 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Christison v. Jones, 405 N.E.2d 8
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Joos v. Drillock, 338 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Wagener
v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Chaffee v. Smith, 645 P.2d 966
(Nev. 1982); Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App. 1994).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Courts prohibiting assignment of legal malpractice claims argue that
assignments would undermine the attorney-client relationship in two basic ways.
First, assignments would jeopardize the attorney's duty of loyalty by creating
conflicts of interest between the attorney and the client.42 Second, assignments
would eliminate the attorney's duty of confidentiality by creating circumstances
where the client's control over the attorney's disclosure of confidential
information would be lost; at the very least, the possibility of an assignment
would inhibit transfer of information between the attorney and the client.43
Courts argue that assignment of legal malpractice claims would jeopardize
the attorney's duty of loyalty by creating a conflict of interest between the
attorney and the client.' The classic occurrence of this conflict of interest would
arise in settlement negotiations. An adversary unable to collect a judgment may
agree to a settlement in exchange for an assignment of any legal malpractice
claims the opposing party may have against her attorney. The adversary would
then seek to obtain and collect ajudgment against the presumably more wealthy
attorney.45 Thus, the attorney is faced with a dilemma. The attorney's duty of
loyalty runs only to the client. However, in accepting the favorable offer to the
client, the attorney is making himself a target for future litigation. 46 Simply put,
the client's interest in accepting a favorable settlement offer, likely extinguishing
his liability, is contrary to the attorney's interest in avoiding a lawsuit. 47 Thus,
courts reason that such an assignment would jeopardize an attorney's duty of
loyalty.
Courts also find that permitting assignments would jeopardize the duty of
loyalty by tempering an attorney's duty of zealous advocacy.48 Zealous
advocacy may force an adversary into offers of settlement (with attendant offers
of assignment), while less than zealous advocacy may sacrifice a defendant's
interest by subjecting him or her to judgment. The adversary's ability to
negotiate a post-judgment assignment is irrelevant at this juncture. The attorney

42. See Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos; 582 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ind. 1991); Zuniga v.
Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. App. 1994).
43. See Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D.N.J. 1996);
Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Ct. App. 1976); Christison v.
Jones, 405 N.E.2d 8, 11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Picadily,582 N.E.2d at 343-34; Joos v.
Drillock, 338 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Wagener v. McDonald, 509
N.W.2d 188, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Chaffee v. Smith 645 P.2d 966, 966 (Nev.
1982) (citing Goodley with approval); Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 316.
44. See supranote 42 and accompanying text.
45. See Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 317.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ind. 1991) (stating that "[i]f
an attorney is providing zealous representation to a client, the client's adversary will
likely be motivated to strike back" and make an offer of assignment to the client); Zuniga
v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. App. 1994).
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is faced with a risk (real or perceived) of personal liability for forcefully
asserting her client's position. An attorney may sacrifice the client to a default
judgment rather than zealously advocating the client's position.4 9 The client may
not have the resources to pursue a client-driven action for legal malpractice,
while the adversary might be in a better financial position to pursue such an
action.5 ° The easy answer is for the attorney not to accept a disadvantaged client,
but this action also implicates further public policy concerns.
Courts reason that assignments would also destroy the confidential
relationship between attorney and client because an attorney's defense of legal
malpractice claims necessarily involves disclosure of a client's confidential
information. 51 In client-driven legal malpractice actions, a client can prevent
disclosure of confidential information simply by dropping suit.5 2 When a client

assigns a claim for legal malpractice, however, the client has no further rights in
the action. 3 As such, the client has no right to force the withdrawal of the
assignee's legal malpractice suit to prevent disclosure of confidential
information. Furthermore, the potential for assignment may cause a client to
restrict an attorney's access to valuable information in a pre-emptive effort to
prevent future disclosure should an assignment become advantageous.54 These
scenarios, courts reason, would violate the sanctity of the confidential
relationship between attorney and client.
Courts prohibiting legal malpractice claims also argue that assignments
would demean the legal profession in three fundamental ways. First,
assignments would create a marketplace for legal malpractice claims that is
inherently detrimental to the legal profession.55 Second, assignments would
require attorneys to advocate patently contradictory positions in successive
proceedings, which would reinforce negative public perception of the legal
profession. 6 Third, assignments would restrict the disadvantaged client's access

49. See, e.g., Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J. 1996).
50. See generallyAlcman, 925 F. Supp. at 252.

51. See Alcman, 925 F. Supp. at 258; Goodley v. Wank & Wank, 133 Cal. Rptr.
83, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Christison v. Jones, 405 N.E.2d 8, 11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980);
Picadilly,582 N.E.2d at 343-44; Joos v. Drillock, 338 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App.

1982); Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Zuniga, 878
S.W.2d at 316.
52. See Picadilly,582 N.E.2d at 343.
53. See 4 ARTHuR L. CoRBiN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 856 (1951) (stating

"[p]rior to notice to the obligor, the assignor still has the power to discharge; and none
after such notice").
54. See Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338, 343 (Ind. 1991).
55. See Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87.

56. See Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. Supp. 252,256-58 (D.N.J. 1996);
Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 317-18 (Tex. App. 1994).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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to competent
legal services, disenfranchising those whom the profession purports
57
to protect.
Courts prohibiting assignments argue that the potential creation of an
economic market for legal malpractice claims is inherently detrimental to the
legal profession. 8 In Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, the court echoed a
common theme: "We do not relish the thought of entrepreneurs purchasing the
legal rights of clients against their attorneys as an ordinary business transaction
in pursuit of profit.' '59 The leading case prohibiting assignments of legal
malpractice claims, Goodley v. Wank & Wank, voiced similar concerns, stating
that "[t]he commercial aspect of assignability of choses in action arising out of
legal malpractice
is rife with probabilities that could only debase the legal
60
profession.,
Courts prohibiting assignment of legal malpractice claims also argue that
the "role reversal" required in the subsequent malpractice action reinforces
negative public perception of the legal profession." This "role reversal" is the
62
requirement that the attorney take contradictory positions in successive suits.
In Alcman Services Corp. v. Bullock, an essentially judgment-proof defendant
suffered a seven million dollar default judgment to the plaintiff. 3 The defendant
then assigned any potential legal malpractice claim against his attorney to the
plaintiff.6 The plaintiff-assignee then sued the attorney for legal malpractice. 5
The positions of the litigants and the tenor of the court is indicated in the
following passage:
In obtaining its $7 million default judgment... [plaintiff] filed an
affidavit swearing that [defendant] rightfully owed [plaintiff] the full
$7 million. [Plaintiff-assignee] now seeks to come before this court
and argue, in essence, that [defendant] did not actually owe the full $7
million but, rather, that some portion of that $7 million was the result
of [the attorney's] malpractice.6

57. See Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87; Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 317-18.
58. See Goodley v. Wank & Wank, 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Ct. App. 1976).
59. Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 316.
60. Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
61. See Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. Supp. 252, 256-58 (D.N.J. 1996);

Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 317-18 (Tex. App. 1994)
62. Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 317-18.
63. Alcman, 925 F. Supp. at 255.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 256. The court in Alcman approached this argument in a unique manner,
using the doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent the plaintiff assignee from arguing
"such fundamentally contradictory positions." Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/14
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The court in Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon67 stated that "[f]or the law to
countenance this abrupt and shameless shift of positions would give prominence
(and substance) to the image that lawyers will take any position depending on
money lies, and that litigation is a mere game and not a search for the
where the
68
truth."
Courts prohibiting assignment agree that the restriction of legal services to
69
all but clients with sufficient assets is also contrary to public policy. The court
in Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon identified the potential restriction: "[T]o
allow assignment would make lawyers reluctant-and perhaps unwilling-to
70
The court in
represent defendants with inadequate insurance and assets.,
result in
surely
most
"would
assignments
that
stated
Wank
Goodley v. Wank &
a
disservice
rendering
thereby
clients
a selective process for carefully choosing
to the public and the profession."'
Courts prohibiting assignment of legal malpractice claims also identify the
risk of collusion as contrary to public policy. 72 In Coffey v. Jefferson County
Board of Education,73 the defendant appeared in court with the plaintiff,
confessed to a one million dollar judgment, and immediately attempted to assign
74
his legal malpractice claim against his attorney to the plaintiff. The court
75
refused to allow the assignment because of the appearance of collusion.
Only three jurisdictions clearly permit the assignment of legal malpractice
claims. Because of the limited number of such opinions and the important
factual background of each, this Note will present the cases permitting
assignments individually.
76
In HedlundManufacturingCo. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, the plaintiffassignees purchased the client's business, which included a pending patent

application. 77 The U.S. Patent Office rejected the application because the
78
client's attorney failed to properly file the application. The client then assigned

67. Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App. 1994).
68. Id. at 318.
69. See Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976); Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 317-18.
70. Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 317.
71. Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
72. See Aleman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D.N.J. 1996);
Coffey v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 756 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988);
Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
73. 756 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
74. Id. at 156.
75. Id. at 157 (stating that "it appears to us that this transaction is so collusive that
same should be held to be against public policy").
76. Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1988).
77. Id. at 358.
78. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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his legal malpractice claim to the plaintiff.79 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the attorney and
found that legal malpractice claims are assignable. 0 The court found that the
legal malpractice claim sounded both in tort and breach of contract and
concerned "purely pecuniary interests., ,8 ' The court rejected the public policy
arguments forwarded by other jurisdictions and stated: "[w]e will not allow the
concept of the attorney-client relationship to be used as a shield by an attorney
to protect him or her from the consequences of legal malpractice. Where the
attorney has caused
harn to his or her client, there is no relationship that remains
82
to be protected."
InAmmon v. McCloskey,83 the plaintiff was a passenger in the client's car,
which was involved in an accident with a third party.
The plaintiff was
awarded a judgment against the client and subsequently released the client from
further liability in exchange for an assignment of the client's legal malpractice
claim against the attorney." The Pennsylvania appellate court permitted the
assignment, following state precedent in Hedlund.86
In Thurston v. ContinentalCasualty Co., 7 the defendant-client suffered a
judgment that it was unable to pay following a products liability lawsuit.88 The
defendant-client assigned its legal malpractice claim to the plaintiff,89 who then
brought suit against the defendant's attorney. 90 The Maine Supreme Court
summarily rejected the public policy arguments forwarded by those courts that
prohibit assignment of legal malpractice claims. 9' The court stated:

79. Id.
80. Id. at 359.
81. Id. (stating that "a claim for damages based upon legal malpractice does not
involve personal injury in that it arises out of negligence and breach of contract, and the
injury alleged concerns purely pecuniary interests. The rights involved are more akin to
property rights which can be assigned prior to liquidation.").
82. Id.
83. Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
84. Id. at 550.
85. Id. at 550-51.
86. Id. at 551.
87. Thurston v. Continental Cas. Co., 567 A.2d 922 (Me. 1989).
88. Id. at 923.
89. There is inconsistency in the interpretation of Thurston concerning whether the
assignee was the plaintiff in the underlying products liability lawsuit or a shareholder of
the corporation. In Wagener v. McDonald,509 N.W.2d 188, 192 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993),
the court determined the assignee was a shareholder; in Ammon, 655 A.2d at 552, the
court determined the assignee was the plaintiff in the underlying suit. The Thurston
opinion reads: "[the defendant's] stockholders, in order to settle some claims by the
products liability plaintiff against them, agreed to have [defendant] assign to her all
[defendant's] rights against its lawyers."
90. Thurston, 567 A.2d at 923.
91. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/14
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[T]he argument that legal services are personal and involve
confidential attorney-client relationships does not justify preventing a
client.., from realizing the value of its malpractice claim in what may

be the most efficient way possible, namely, its assignment to someone
else with a clear interest in the92claim who also has the time, energy
and resources to bring the suit.
In Oppelv. EmpireMutual InsuranceCo.,93 a truck driven by the defendant
struck the plaintiffs infant son.94 The plaintiff offered to settle the case for
$10,000, the limits of the defendant's liability insurance. 95 The defendant made
a counter-offer, which was rejected.9 6 The plaintiff recovered ajudgment against
the defendant for $421,850.25. 97 Subsequently, the defendant-client assigned his
claims against his insurance carrier and attomey.98 The Southern District Court
of New York determined that the legal malpractice claim was assignable because
99
it sounded both in contract and in tort not involving personal injury.
Other jurisdictions have allowed assignment of legal malpractice claims, but
the factual posture of these cases indicates that the extent of assignment may be
limited.100 However, these courts have not subsequently addressed the
assignment of legal malpractice claims so that the results of future cases remain
uncertain.' O'

92. Id.
93. Oppel v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
94. Id. at 1306.
95. Id.
96. Id. The counteroffer was approximately $9,500."
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1307. In Oppel, the court stated: "[T]here is no allegation that the
attorney's acts caused any personal injury, only pecuniary. This claim is...
assignable." Id.
100. See Richter v. Analex Corp., 940 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1996) (assignee was
purchaser-successor in interest of assignor's corporation); Collins v. Fitzwater, 560 P.2d
1074 (Or. 1977) (assignees were purchasers of unregistered securities issued by
corporation of which defendant-assignor was director).
101. Courts have also had to decide whether assignments of legal malpractice
claims by operation of law are valid. The usual question is whether a bankruptcy trustee
receives an assignment of the debtor's potential legal malpractice claims. The results of
these cases are inconsistent. Compare Scarlett v. Barnes, 121 B.R. 578 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1990) (legal malpractice claims are non-assignable and thus are exempt from-the
bankruptcy estate) with Hoth v. Stogsdill, 569 N.E.2d 34, 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(questioning whether legal malpractice claims are exempt from the bankruptcy estate
based on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). See also FDICv. Martin, 770 F. Supp.
623 (M.D. Fla. 1991), in which the court held that the FDIC as receiver ofthe bank-client
received an assignment of the bank's legal malpractice claims against its attorneys. The
decision preempted contrary state law.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In White v. Auto-Club Inter-Insurance Exchange, the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Western District of Missouri first recognized that assignments
for purely personal torts are prohibited in Missouri.'02 The court then determined
that although legal malpractice claims involve economic damages, the attorneyclient relationship, being highly personal, compels a finding that legal
malpractice is a tort claim. 3 Because of this personal relationship and the
economic aspects of legal malpractice, the tort cannot be classified as a purely
personal tort or a tort to real or personal property."°
The court cited Goodley v. Wank & Wank and agreed with the policy

arguments against assignment of legal malpractice claims. The court agreed that
allowing assignment of legal malpractice claims would create a marketplace for
legal malpractice claims, jeopardize the duty of loyalty and confidentiality, and
restrict access to competent legal services.'0 5 Accordingly, the court held that
because legal malpractice claims are non-assignable on public policy grounds,
the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Gould. 6
V. COMMENT

A majority of courts addressing the assignability of legal malpractice claims
have held such assignments invalid on public policy grounds. 7 However, these
courts have not examined in-depth the policy arguments against assignments.
Although some of the arguments are persuasive, some lack merit. This Note will
explore the viability of these public policy arguments against assignability of
legal malpractice claims.
Before reaching considerations of-public policy, resolution of whether a
legal malpractice claim sounds in contract or in tort and whether the claim
survives is necessary. An attorney's failure to use the requisite skill and
knowledge in the client's representation looks like negligence. Indeed, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct speak exclusively in terms of duty." 8

102. White v. Auto Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 984 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 160.

106. Id.
107. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
108. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1998) (stating that

"[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation"); Rule 1.3 (stating "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and

promptness in representing a client"); Rule 1.7(2) (stating "[a] lawyer shall not represent
a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/14
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Thus, a majority of courts agree that a legal malpractice claim sounds in tort."°
A legal malpractice claim is also most analogous to a tort to personal property.
Although the attorney-client relationship is a personal one, the damage sustained
is pecuniary, like damages in a tort to personal property. Because a cause of
action for a tort to personal property survives,110 legal malpractice claims are
assignable unless contrary to public policy.'

Some courts prohibiting assignment argue that such assignments would
undermine the attorney-client relationship byjeopardizing the attorney's duty of
loyalty."2 The potential for assignment would readily create a conflict ofinterest
between the attorney and the client. The client's interest in accepting a favorable
settlement offer that includes an assignment is contrary to the attorney's interest
in avoiding personal liability. In assignments to adversaries, this conflict of
interest is inescapable. The Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct require the
attorney to avoid all conflicts of interest.! 13 The real possibility of assignment
to an adversary is a persuasive public policy argument against allowing such
assignments.
Courts prohibiting assignment also maintain that assignments would
undermine an attorney's duty of loyalty by tempering the attorney's duty of
zealous advocacy. Implication of the duty of zealous advocacy via the duty of
loyalty stands on different footing than the potential conflict of interest and is
ultimately unpersuasive. Less than zealous advocacy will only make the
realization of a malpractice claim possible. If assignments were permitted, the
attorney's best defense against liability would be to provide zealous advocacy.
While it is true that the attorney would have to defend a frivolous lawsuit, this
concern involves the prohibition of assignments generally, not the duty of
zealous advocacy. The attorney's duty of zealous advocacy would only be
reinforced if assignments were permitted; this public policy argument against
assignments is meritless.
The argument that assignments would undermine the attorney's duty of
confidentiality is similarly unpersuasive. In client-driven suits, the client can

responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests").
109. See Alcman, 925 F. Supp. at 258; Christison,405 N.E.2d at 11; Tawil v.
Finkelstein Bruckman Wohl Most & Rothman, 646 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692-93 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996); Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa.
1988); Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa. Super. 1995). See also Goodley
v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Christison, 405
N.E.2d at 9 (stating "[t]he cause of action ...

is, in its essence, a tort action for

negligence premised upon breach of the attorney's duties to his client").
110. See Dougherty, supra note 19, at 684.
111. See Dougherty, supra note 19, at 684.
112. See supranote 42, 43 and accompanying text.
113. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1998) (stating
"[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by... the lawyer's own interests").
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prevent disclosure by dropping the suit. In assignments, the client does not have
this escape hatch. Nevertheless, when the client decides to assign his legal
malpractice claim, he should be aware of the consequences. In fact, the attorney
likely would be negligent in failing to inform the client of the ramifications of
such an action. When a client assigns her legal malpractice claim, she is
consenting to disclosure of confidential information. The client can avoid
disclosure by not assigning the claim. The decision is still in the client's control,
but the decision must be made at an earlier juncture than in a client-driven suit.
The duty of confidentiality is destroyed by the client, not the assignment. The
potential breach of the duty of confidentiality is not a valid argument against
assignments.
Courts prohibiting assignments also argue that the practice would demean
the legal profession by: (1) creating a distasteful market for legal malpractice
claims,' 14 (2) reinforcing negative public perception of the
profession," 5 and (3)
16
restricting the availability of competent legal services."
The argument that the creation of a marketplace for legal malpractice claims
would demean the profession is, in reality, merely a subset of the profession's
latent antagonism toward legal advertising in general." 7 If advertisements for
legal services were forbidden, public awareness of the ability to assign legal
malpractice claims would be limited. Without public awareness, assignments
could only demean the profession from within. Yet, a marketplace for legal
malpractice claims would not demean the profession from within; attorneys now
sue other attorneys for legal malpractice with increasing frequency." 8 Moreover,
it could be argued that assignments would improve public perception of the
profession by rebutting the sentiment that attorneys "stick together." Potential
marketability is not a valid public policy argument against assignments.
The "role reversal" required of attorneys is, however, demeaning to the
legal profession both from the public's perspective and from within. While
perpetuation of legal fiction is sometimes necessary to maintain stability in the
law, this is not one of those instances. It is worth repeating the statement of the
court in Zuniga: "[f]or the law to countenance this abrupt and shameless shift
of positions would give prominence (and substance) to the image that lawyers
will take any position depending on where the money lies, and that litigation is

114. See Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976).
115. See Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. Supp. 252,256-58 (D.N.J. 1996).
116. See Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87; Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878

S.W.2d 313, 317-18 (Tex. App. 1994).
117. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2 cmt. 3
(1998) (stating that "[s]ome jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against
television advertising... or against 'undignified advertising"').
118. See generally Gary N. Schumann & Scott B. Herlihy, The Impending Wave
ofLegal MalpracticeLitigation-Predictions,Analysis, and Proposalsfor Change, 30
ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1998).
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a mere game and not a search for the truth..... That attorneys can advocate both
sides of an issue in normal situations is a necessity in the legal system. Indeed,
even this ability is one source of public mistrust in the legal profession.
Allowing attorneys to advocate both sides of the same issue in successive
lawsuits would justify negative public perception.
This "role reversal" would also demean the profession from within. The
legal system operates to vindicate an injured party's legal rights; compensation
for the vindication is consequential. If assignments were permitted, the
assignee's attorney would be arguing the adversary's position solely for the
purpose of collection and would be placing compensation before vindication of
legal rights. Attorneys are not, or should not be, automatons for their client's
objectives. 2 Attorneys are officers of the court with all of the attendant
responsibilities thereof.'2' This "role reversal" would involve introspection that
a conscientious attorney would not wish to bear, but that would be required to
pursue the client's interest.
Assignments would damage the profession's public reputation and require
attorneys to advocate positions unrelated to the vindication of their clients' legal
rights. Therefore, "role reversal" is a compelling public policy argument against
assignments.
Assignments also inappropriately restrict the access "persons of limited
means" have to competent legal services. The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct state that the rules encouraging pro bono service "recognize [that a]
critical need for legal services exists among persons of limited means."' The
ModelRules further state that "[e]very lawyer... has a responsibility to provide
legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement can be one of the
most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer.' 2' Doubtless any attorney
would not find the experience very rewarding when his pro bono client assigns
a legal malpractice claim in exchange for a release of liability. The attorney
might seek to avoid this situation by refusing to represent "persons of limited
means," which would affront the policy in favor of assisting indigents through
the provision of free legal services.
Creation of the risk of collusion is also a compelling public policy argument
against assignments. The bargain-exchange, extinguishing one's liability and
creating liability in another, likely innocent party, should not be condoned. That
an attorney would be omitted from the adversary's initial query about the

119. Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 318.
120. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. 1
(stating that "a lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or employ means simply
because a client may wish that the lawyer do so").
121. See generallyMODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (stating

that "[a] lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice").
122. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 cmt. 2 (1998).
123. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 cmt. 1 (1998).
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possibility of an assignment is a given. The adversarial system and the goals of
justice would be diminished. It could be argued that common settlements
operate to diminish the adversarial system. This may be true to a certain extent,
but common settlements do not operate at the expense of parties unable to
negotiate their position. Assignments would. engender collusion. The law
should not enable that which it seeks to prohibit.
It is noteworthy that courts permitting assignments have allowed
assignment only when the assignee was an adversary or was in some other way
involved in the underlying dispute."2 These courts reason that assignees should
be able to realize their claims by whatever legal means available."z This policy
favoring assignments is wholly unsatisfying in relation to the public policy
arguments against assignment.
The persuasive public policies against assignments all involve assignments
to the adversary in the underlying lawsuit. Each of the policies against
assignment, standing alone, rebuts the "collection by whatever means" argument
favoring assignment. Nevertheless, the question remains whether the client
should be allowed to assign her claim to an unrelated third party. Although the
policy arguments against assignment to unrelated third parties (creation of a
market for legal malpractice claims) are unpersuasive, prohibiting assignment to
one class and allowing assignment to another would raise problems in
application. Creative solutions to such a division abound; asking the courts to
divine the real party leads to the conclusion that a per se prohibition of
assignments is sound.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Missouri Court of Appeal for the Westem District of Missouri correctly
decided that assignment of legal malpractice claims should be prohibited.
Unfortunately, however, the public policy arguments were not fully developed.
While the most compelling public policy arguments prohibiting assignments
involve only assignments to adversaries, a per se rule against assignments is
required for stability of the law and consistency in application.
JOHN M. LIMBAUGH

124. See generally Alcman Services Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J.

1996); Oppel v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Thurston v.
Continental Cas. Co., 567 A.2d 922 (Me. 1989); Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler
& Spivak, 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1988); Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1995).
125. See Thurston, 567 A.2d at 923.
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